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ABSTRACT
Many social commentators have raised concerns over the possibility that increased sorting in a
society can lead to greater inequality. To investigate this we construct a dynamic model of intergenerational
education acquisition, feitility, and marital sorting and parameteiize the steady state to match several basic
empirical findings. Contraiyto Kremer' s (1997) finding of a basically insignificant effect of marital sorting
on inequality, we find that increased marital sorting will significantly increase income inequality. Three
factors are central to our findings: a negative conelation between fertility and education, a decreasing
marginal effect of parental education on children's years of education, and wages that are sensitive to the
relative supply of skilled workers.
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Many social commentators claim that American society is becoming more strat-
ified, in the sense that individuals are tending to interact more with others who
are similar to themselves, and less with others who are different. These inter-
actions include who one works with, who one marries, who one goes to school
with, and who one has as neighbors.1 Thus, increased stratification or sorting
may take place along the dimensions of skills, income, education, aptitude, race
and ethnicity.
Why might increased sorting matter? It has been hypothesized that increased
sorting may reduce redistribution, increase negative activities such as crime, or
reduce positive peer effects in school. Some observers (e.g. Wilson (1987) and Re-
ich (1991)) have argued that increased sorting may have significant consequences
for the degree of inequality in society, with more sorting leading to greater in-
equality. A recent and provocative paper by Kremer (1997), however, argues that
the quantitative effects of even very large increases in sorting—whether marital
or residential—are likely to be negligible, at least as concerns the distribution of
income and education.
The objective of this paper is to investigate in greater depth the effects of
increased marital sorting on inequality. In order to do so, we examine a model
of intergenerational education acquisition and marital sorting and parameterize
it to match several basic empirical findings. We find that increased sortingmay
significantly increase income inequality.
Our model is very simple. Individuals are either skilled (college educated) or
unskilled (high-school educated). They meet, marry and have children. Unable to
borrow against future human capital, families decide how many of their children
to send to college based on their family income, their children's abilities, and the
expected wage differential for skilled relative to unskilled labor. The distribution
of education determines wages, and together they determine the distribution of
'Whether stratification or what we will generally call "sorting" has actually increased is a
separate question and one that we will not investigate here. Kremer and Maskin (1996) present
some evidence in support of the argument that sorting by skill level in the workplace has in-
creased. Evidence on marital sorting appears mixed. Based on years of schooling, the evidence
leads to the conclusion that sorting has not increased; however, the decreased probability that
certain educational barriers will be crossed (e.g. high school graduate married to college grad-
uate), suggests greater sorting (Mare 1991). Sorting at the neighborhood level appears not to
have increased (Kremer 1997), whereas annecdotal evidence of increased tracking in schools and
the proliferation of magnet schools suggests that sorting in schools may be increasing.
2income. We solve for the steady states of the dynamic model; perhaps not sur-
prisingly, the existence of borrowing constraints generates multiple steady states.
The degree of sorting in this model is reflected in the fraction of the population
that gets perfectly (as opposed to randomly) matched with a marriage partner.
An increase in the degree of sorting can, in theory, either increase or decrease
the skilled fraction of the population, depending on a number of factors that we
discuss in our analysis. In our calibrated model we find that if marital sorting
increases, then a smaller fraction of children will become skilled. This drives
down wages for unskilled workers and increases those of skilled workers and also
increases the degree of wage inequality. If as a result of lower wages, borrowing
constraints become tighter for low-income families, the effect on wage inequality
is further magnified.
Contrasting our findings with that of Kremer's, we find three factors, all ab-
sent in Kremer's analysis (and, we argue, present in the data), to be central to
our results. In particular, a negative correlation between fertility and education,
a decreasing marginal effect of parental education on children's years of educa-
tion, and a process of wage determination that is sensitive to the relative supply
of skilled to unskilled workers all contribute to our qualitative and quantitative
conclusions.
In addition to the paper by Kremer, our work is related to several others in
the literature. Benabou (1996a), Caucutt (1997), Cooper (1997), Durlauf (1995),
Epple and Romano (1996) and Fernandez and Rogerson (1996, 1997) examine the
effects of neighborhood and school sorting generated either endogenously by edu-
cation policies or exogenously via increased neighborhood stratification. Banerjee
and Newman (1993), Benabou (1996b), Fernandez and Rogerson (1998), Galor
and Zeira (1993), Loury (1981), and Ljungvist (1993) examine the effects of the
existence of borrowing constraints on the dynamic evolution of the economy and
income inequality. The effects of endogenous fertility on income distribution (and
vice versa) have recently been the subject of analysis in Dahan and Tsiddon
(1998), Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles (1999), and Kremer and Chen (1999)
among others.
The outline of the paper follows. In the next section we describe the model
and its steady states. In section 3 we analyze the effects of Ghanges in sorting.
In section 4 we use data to parameterize the model, and in section 5 we use our
pararneterized model to assess the effects of a large increase in sorting. Section 6
reviews Kremer's analysis and contrasts it with our own. Section 7 examines the
robustness of our results to alternative pararneterizations and Sectioii 8 concludes.
32. The Model
To examine the effects of marital sorting on the process of intergenerational edu-
cation transmission and income inequality requires a dynamic model that incor-
porates marriage, fertility, education and the determination of income. The inter-
action of these factors easily yields a non-tractable model (see Greenwood, Guner
and Knowles (1999) for a computational approach to this problem) so, wherever
possible, we choose to model these decisions in as simple a way as possible, keep-
ing many elements exogenous (in particular fertility and marriage decisions) in
order to highlight the interactions that are central to our analysis.2
The story our model tells is a simple one. In each period the adult population
is characterized by a distribution of education or skill levels. We assume that
individuals are either skilled or unskilled and that a competitive labor market
determines the relative wages of these workers. These individuals meet and marry,
with their marriage partners determined via an exogenous matching process that
exhibits positive assortative matching. Couples have children and, based on the
number of children, their aptitudes, family income, and expected wages, they
decide the education levels of their children. This generates the next generation's
distribution of education (skill levels). A more formal description follows.
Marriages
Consider a population at time t whose number is given by t and some division
of that population into skilled workers, n, and unskilled workers, m, where:
='st +71'ut (2.1)
For our purposes, skill levels will be synonymous with an educational attainment.
All college-educated workers are skilled (s); all others are unskilled (u).
Each individual is matched with another, resulting in a "marriage" according
to the following mechanical process. In order to capture the degree of sorting in
the economy, we allow some fraction of marriages, say G, to be perfectly matched,
i.e., a skilled worker marries another skilled worker or an unskilled worker marries
another unskilled worker. The remaining fraction of the population is matched in
a random fashion. Thus marriages will belong to one of three.categories: skilled
marries skilled (denoted by h for high type), skilled marries unskilled (denoted by
m for mixed or middle type), and unskilled marries unskilled (denoted by 1 for
2As we argue in the conclusion, we believe that most plausible ways of endogenizing fertility
and marital decisions will reinforce our conclusions.
4low type). These categories will also correspond to the relative position of couples
in the income distribution.
Given the degree of assortative matching 9 and the distribution of the popula-
tion at time t into skilled and unskilled, the total number of high type marriages
at time t, h, is given by:
=
where
0/3 + (1 —8)/3 (2.2)
and 3 is the ratio of skilled workers in the population, i.e.,
(2.3)





whereas the number that are low type is given by:
=
where
9(1 —i3)+ (1 —9)(1
—3)2 (2.5)
Of course, Aht + \mt + )'lt= 1and h + mt + i =
Children
Fertility undoubtedly depends on parental education, income, culture and
technology among other things. We simplify matters by assuming that fertil-
ity is determined entirely by the educational backgrounds of the parents. Thus,
fertility is only a function of marriage type and can be denoted by f, j =h,m,
or I (so that all families of marriage type jhavethe same number of children).3
31t would not be difficult to relax this assumption, but this would offer little additional
insight.
5A child can be of two "aptitude" types which we denote by either high or low,
the significance of which will be made clear shortly. The probability that a given
child is of high aptitude, -y, j =h,rn 1 is allowed to differ across family types
but not across families within the same category.4 Realizations are independent
across children. The probability, therefore, that a family with a total number of
children f has ii< f3children of high aptitude is 'y(1 _y)fi_7()where()is
the binomial coefficient (equal to the number of combinations of f3 things taken
n. at a time).
Education
A family's decision to send a child on to college is determined by the child's
aptitude, family income, and expected wages. If a child with high aptitude obtains
a college education, we assume she receives one unit of skilled human capital,
whereas a low aptitude child who goes on to college is assumed to obtain zero
units of skilled human capital.5 The quantity of unskilled human capital that a
child obtains is assumed to be independent of her aptitude level, i.e., all individuals
who obtain oniy a high-school education have the same level of human capital.
The aptitude (and education) of a child is assumed to be perfectly observable to
all.
We assume that the cost of sending a child to high school is zero whereas a
positive (constant) cost, ii,mustbe incurred before obtaining a higher education.
To render the decision of whether to send a child to college as simple as possible,
we assume that, subject to obtaining a minimum per capita consumption level of
a family would always desire to send a high-aptitude child to college if the net
return from doing so, w3 —ii, exceededthe return from high school, w. More
formally, if a family of type j with iihighaptitude children sends r n of them
on to college, and has per capita consumption equal to c, we assume they receive
utility
'In this sense perhaps the term aptitude is a misnomer since, strictly speaking it is not
genetically determined (otherwise we would have to keep track of whether a couple included
0, 1, or 2 high-aptitude individuals). It is best thought of as a high or a low ability to obtain
marketable skills from college. This ability is assumed to depend on parental education and
hence differs across family types.
5We could easily assume that a low aptitude child ends up with p <1iinits of skilled human
capital. This would multiply the number of potential steady states we have to examine but not
add any new factor of interest to our analysis.
6f (e—)forc< =
(c
—) +(f)WS + otherwise (2.6)
where w and w are next period's wages for skilled and unskilled workersrespec-
tively.
Wages
We assume a constant returns to scale aggregate production function given
by:
F(n, n) =nF(n/m,1) nF(1,
1)nf(/3) (2.7)
> 0, f'<o
Assuminga competitive labor market, it follows that wages are determined only
by the value of /3:
=(1-/3)2f1(/3)andw(j3)= f(/3)-/3(1-/3)f'(/3) (2.8)
where the assumptions in (2.7) imply that skilled wages are decreasing in the ratio
of skilled to unskilled workers and the opposite for unskilledwages. Note that no
family would want to send their child to college if the fraction of skilled workers
exceeds 3, where /3isdefined by:
(2.9)
We assume henceforth that /3 is strictly positive.Note, furthermore, that 3 would
be the fraction of the population that would attend college if there were no borrow-
ing constraints and. on aggregate, the fraction of high aptitude children exceeded
13.
BudgetConstra? nts
The utility maximization problem of a family of type jwithn. high-aptitude
children is given by the maximization of U3 as specified in (2.6) subject to a
budget constraint. Note that in the absence of any impedimnts to borrowing
against future income, all high-aptitude children would attend college as long as
6We use this linear utility function for simplicity only; we could specify a concave utility
function. It would be equally simple to incorporate discounting of children's future income or
differential weights on family members' consumptions.
7/3 <in the subsequent period. With borrowing constraints, however, household
income is an important determinant of the number of children that a family can
afford to send to college.
In what follows, we assume that families are unable to access credit or in-
surance markets.7 For interpretational purposes, however, we think that it is
important to note that these borrowing constraints need not be thought of as
constraining directly the capacity of a family to send a child to college (which is
debatable as some colleges are close to free) 8Instead,in a richer model the inabil-
ity to borrow against a child's future income could serve to constrain a family's
residential choice and consequently the quality of the high school their children
can attend. This would then affect both the amount of human capital obtained
from high school attendance and the probability that the child attends college.
Thus utility maximization is subject to a household-income budget constraint:




Ij(/3) = w(/3) + w(/3) for j =rn (2.11)
2w(/3) for j =I
Note that a higher fraction of skilled workers implies lower wages for skilled
workers and higher ones for unskilled workers. Hence, an increase in /3 implies
tighter budget constraints for high-type families and looser ones for low-type fam-
ilies. Whether the budget constraint for middle-type families is loosened or tight-
ened depends on whether the increase in the wage of unskilled workers is greater
TIt is, of course, not necessary to shut down capital markets altogether in order to obtain
the result we desire—that the maximum number of children a family can afford to send to
college is a function of family income. It is simple to write clown micro-foundations (e.g.,
moral hazard or imperfect enforcement technology) for this or less extreme assumptions (see,
for example, Ljungvist (1993), Banerjee and Newman (1993), or Galor an1 Zeira (1993)). Note
also that families would want to pool risk since the number of high aptitude children each has
is stochastic.
8Although, of course, there are subsistence costs to be met, etc. Indeed Behrman, Pollak, and
Taubman (1989) argue that unequal access to financing for college can help explain differences
in educational attainment.
8than the accompanying decrease in skilled wages, i.e., on whether n.3 —ri,.is pos-
itive.
2.1.SteadyStates
It is straightforward to show that if /3isthe fraction of the population that is
skilled in period t, then next period's value of /3 is uniquely determined. The
dynamic evolution of this economy will of course depend on the fertility of each
family type, the fraction of children of each type that are of high aptitude, wages,
minimum required consumption, and the cost of college.
Though the economy will follow a unique path starting from any initial con-
dition, in general this economy may have multiple steady states. To see why this
is the case, note that the fraction of skilled workers in the economy determines
the income level for each marriage type, which in turn determines who can afford
to attend college. A higher fraction of skilled workers implies a higher wage for
unskilled workers, thereby tightening constraints for high-type families, loosening
constraints for low-type families and having an ambiguous effect for middle-type
families. Thus, a low initial proportion of skilled workers can be reinforcing if as
a consequence of low unskilled wages a large fraction of families find themselves
constrained. Similarly, a high initial proportion of skilled workers can be reinforc-
ing if as a consequence of high unskilled wages a small fraction of families find
themselves constrained. This positive feedback effect can give rise to multiple
steady states.
Finding the potential steady-states of the system is simple. Suppose that
families of type jcanafford to send a maximum of z children to college (and
find it desirable to do so). To solve for the fraction of their children that type j
familieswill send to college in aggregate, F3(z), requires finding the distribution
of high-aptitude children over type jfamiliesand evaluating which of these are
constrained. In particular, we need to calculate
Zj/;\ f 7\ =JJ)(i
—7.)fi8+3)(i
—)fi_S (2.12) s=1 '2s=z+1
S
wherethe first summation finds the fraction of children that go to college from
families of type jthatare not constrained (as the number of high-aptitude kids
they have is less than z) and the second summation does the same for constrained
families of type j.
9We can now solve for the potential steady states of the system by examining
the fixed point generated by the dynamic system described in equation (2.13)
below for each possible vector of z =(zh, Zm,zi)suchthat z<f3 Vj. Hence the
potential steady states of the economy, /3, are the solutions to:
F(z)ft(/3t; 9) st+1
2 13 — —
fX,t(/3,;8)
suchthat 13t+i= /3=
Ofcourse, not all these potential steady-states will be actual steady states.
First, parents must wish to send their children to college, i.e., /3 < /3. Second, a
choice of z corresponds to an assumption about the extent to which borrowing
constraints bind, i.e., about the maximum number of children each family type
can afford to send to college. In equilibrium the assumed value of z must in fact
be consistent with the family budget constraints implied by the steady-state levels
of skilled and unskilled wages corresponding to the value of /3. Hence, z and 3
must jointly satisfy, Vj:
(2+f)+zv I) (2.14)
and either of the equations below:
(2+f)+(z1+1)v > Ij() (2.15)
orz =
Furthermore,we will restrict our attention to locally stable steady states, so an
additional constraint to be met is < 1.
3. Changes in Sorting
How will a change in the degree of sorting (i.e., in the level of 0) affect the steady-
state level of 3? In answering this question it is useful to distinguish two cases: one
in which the change in sorting does not affect the maximum number of children
any family type can afford to send to college and the other in which it does. In
the first case what we will call the "bindingness" of borrowing constraints is not
affected; in the second case it is.9
91n a model with a continuous income distribution, there would always be a change in the
bindingness of borrowing constraints for some families (as long as some of them were constrained
10Assume initially that the bindingness of constraints is not affected (i.e., as-
suming that z does not change and hence that the F3 's are constant). Using the




Taking the derivatives of the )'s (given by (2.2), (2.4) and (2.5)), evaluating
at /3 = /3, and substituting into the expression above yields:
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Note that one way to think about what an increase in sorting does is that for
every two middle-type marriages it destroys, it creates one high and one low-type
marriage. With this in mind, note that an interpretation of (3.2) is that increased
sorting increases the steady-state fraction of the population that attends college
if the result of substituting two middle types by one high and one low type on net
increases the number of children that attend college by more than what would
result from that same substitution and all three types sending a fraction 3 of their
children to college.
in the initial equilibrium). Thus this second channel would always be present. In our discrete
model, whether constraints become more binding depends on the cost of college relative to
family income. Thus, small changes in sorting may not affect the extent to which families are
constrained.
11It is easy to evaluate (3.1) or (3.2) in a few special instances. Consider first the
case where the Fj's are constant across family types, i.e., F =F,Vj. Then, by
(2.13), /3 =F,and a change in the degree of sorting has no effect on the economy
(e.g., if all family types send 10% of their children to college, the steady-state
fraction of the population that attends college is 10%, irrespective of the degree
of sorting).
Next consider the case where the F3's are not identical but where fertility is
constant across family types, i.e., fa =f.In such case the sign of (3.1) is given
by the sign of Fh + F1 —2Fm.The intuition behind this is simple given the earlier
observation: Since fertility is the same across family types, the effect of increased
sorting depends on whether the fraction of children sent to college on average by
two middle-type marriages (2Fm) is smaller than the combined fraction of children
that go to college on average in one high and one low type family (Fh + F1).
Another case for which it is relatively easy to derive an expression is for when
Fh + Fi —2Fm=0and f + fi —2fm=0.In this case, after manipulating (3.2),
it is easy to see that the sign of the effect of an increase in £ is given by the
sign of (F,, —F1)(fh
—fi).This is an interesting case since it implies that if both
fertility and the probability of attending college are linear in parents' average
years of education, the effect of increased sorting is to decrease the fraction of
the population that attends college if children of high-type parents have a greater
probability of attending college and if the fertility of low-type parents is greater
than that of high types.
Lastly, it is useful to note from (3.2) that a sufficient condition for increased
sorting to impact negatively on /3 is for fF2fmFm+fiFi <0 and fh+fm2fl ￿
0 (with at least one inequality strict). The first expression captures whether the
number of children that on average attend college is increased or decreased by
substituting two m couples by an h and an 1. Thus, it indicates by how much the
population that attends college would increase given this substitution. The second
expression captures the amount by which the population as a whole is increased or
decreased by substituting two m couples by an h and an 1. Obviously, a decrease
in the population attending college will, ceteris paribus, serve to reduce /3, as will
an increase in the overall population (since it dilutes further the gain/loss of the
first term). As we shall see further on, our parameterization4mplies that both
inequalities hold strictly and hence that increases in sorting decrease the fraction
of the population that goes to college.
As mentioned previously, the degree of sorting can also affect the steady-state
level of /3 via its effect on the tightness of borrowing constraints. To see this,
12suppose that, keeping z constant as before, an increase in 9 decreases 3. This
smaller proportion of skilled workers is associated with lower unskilledwages and
higher skilled wages. The change in wages will increase family income for high
types and decrease it for low types, and thus may lead to less binding constraints
for the first group and tighter ones for the second. Should this happen, the original
equilibrium values of the z3 's and hence of the F3's would no longer be feasible
and / will fall even further. That is, a change in the degree of sorting can affect
the feasibility (in steady-state equilibrium) of different values of z.
4. Parameterizing the Model
In this section we parameterize our model. We choose parameters so that the
cross-section data generated in a steady state of the model are consistent with
similar cross-section relationships that hold in actual US data. This ensures that
the reduced-form relationships implied by this steady state of the model are "rea-
sonable".
Recall that in the model there are three types of marriages—high, middle and
low—which differ in both the average education and the average income of the
couple. Each type of marriage j is further characterized by two numbers: f3, the
number of children per couple, andthe fraction of kids (on average) from that
marriage type that have the aptitude to benefit from skill acquisition. These two
profiles are central to our analysis, so much of our discussion will focus on them.
Fertility
It is empirically well-established that fertility rates are negatively correlated
with both income and education. Even for the US, the magnitude of these differ-
ences are fairly large, especially between the lower and upper end of the distribu-
tions. For example, using data from the CPS for 1995, (Table 103 from the 1997
Statistical Abstract of the US) the cross-sectional fertility rate for women aged
15-44 is roughly one and a half times larger in the lowest quartile of the house-
hold income distribution than it is for the top quartile of the household income
distribution.'0 Similar magnitudes are found in the relationship between parental
education and fertility. Using data from the PSID we find that couples in which
100f course, annual income measures do not necessarily reflect where a household lies in the
distribution of lifetime income. An alternative comparison using lifetime income is computed
by Knowles (1999) using PSID data. His numbers indicate that fertility in the lowest quintile
is roughly one and a half times that for the highest quintile.
13neither parent finished high school (roughly the bottom fifth of the education
distribution) have approximately 1.5 times the number of children (2.65 versus
1.82) as do couples in which both parents have at least some college (roughly
the top fifth of the sample).'1 The relationship is not linear, however. Couples
in which both parents have high-school educations have only marginally higher
fertility (1.88) than do couples in which both parents have college degrees (1.79).
The evidence above suggests modelling the fertility of low-type couples as 1.5
times that of high-type couples, which is what we elect to do.'2 We choose fertility
rates of 2, 2, and 3 for high, middle and low types respectively for our benchmark
model.'3 As will be seen further on, this choice yields a steady state in which
low-type marriages constitute roughly 25% of the population and hence represent
the bottom quartile of both the income and education distribution. Thus, this
parameterization generates the facts cited above as well as respecting the fact
that fertility differentials become fairly small outside the bottom quartile of the
distribution. Nonetheless, we also carry out a sensitivity analysis to our choice
of fertility profile. As we report, even abstracting completely from any fertility
differences we still obtain large quantitative effects resulting from changes in the
degree of sorting.
Aptitude
We have no direct measure of the fraction of children from marriages of differ-
ent types that have an aptitude for skill acquisition. The PSID, however, contains
data on the relationship between the educational attainments of parents and their
children. We create a sample by selecting all individuals over 25 in the 1993 PSID
whose parents were in the PSID in 1968. For the purposes of this exercise we split
this sample into skill categories by counting all individuals with high school or
below as unskilled, and all individuals with some college or above as skilled. We
find that the fraction of children from high-type families that become skilled is .81,
whereas the values for middle and low-type families are .63 and .30 respectively.
"Some studies argue that maternal education is a more important determinant of fertility
than is average parental education. Again, using data from the PSID we find that fertility rates
of women with less than high school, high school and some college and above are 3.6, 2.9 and
2.5 respectively. Once again, the ratio of top to bottom is about 1.5.
12jmakingthis choice there is an implicit assumption that recently educated cohorts, which
have roughly 55% of their members going beyond high school, will have a distribution of fertility
across quartiles that resembles those of older cohorts.
1As we have chosen to model all families of the same type as having the same number of
children, we are restricted to integer choices for our fertility rates. It would be easy to modify
this but we chose not to so so as it would introduce considerably more notation.
14Thus, in the steady state of our model the ['3's must match these values.
As is evident from equation (2.12), F is a function ofand z. Thus, the
probability that a child from a particular marriage type is of high aptitude (i.e., the
can be deduced from the value of F3 in conjunction with an assumption about
the maximum number of children that family type can afford to send to college
(i.e., the z) in the steady state. Table 1 illustrates this mapping by showing
the values of the y's implied by various assumptions regarding the tightness of
borrowing constraints subject to the constraint that eachzi) pair yield the
aggregate F3 found in the data.
The first column of Table 1 corresponds to a case in which no one is constrained—
all high-aptitude children become skilled. In this case the values of F3's and
must coincide. The second column assumes that only low-type families are con-
strained and that these can afford to send at most two kids to college. Lastly, the
third column assumes that low-type families can afford to send only one child to
college.'4
Table 1
Aptitude Profiles Under Various Scenarios
Aptitude Zh =Zrn = 2,Z =3Z Z == 2Zh =Zm=2,Z = 1
Yh .81 .81 .81
7m .63 .63 .63
.30 .31 .33
Our analysis, for the most part, is independent of which of these scenarios
we take to represent the steady state. If the maximum number of children that
different family types can afford to send to college remains unchanged when the
degree of sorting increases, then as equation (3.2) indicates, the effect of sorting
depends only on the F3's which are given by the data; the mix of 'y's and z used
to generate them is irrelevant. It is only when we allow the equilibrium steady-
state value of z to be affected by the increased degree of sorting that the exact
specification might matter. But even in that case all that matters to our results,
Note that our benchmark specification does not allow us to consider the case of either h or
m type families being constrained (or more generally that all variation a&oss family types is a
result of borrowing constraints), since the assumption that high and middle families have two
kids implies that any constraint would have less than 50% of them attending college. Since in
the data more than 50% of children from these family types attend college, this option is not
feasible. One way to get around this would be to assume (more realistically) that the number
of children a family has is drawn from a distribution that differs according to family type.
15as will be seen in the next section, is that there be a large group of individuals
that are affected by a tightening of the borrowing constraints.
We choose the second column of the table for our benchmark specification;
i.e., we assume that borrowing constraints do not affect middle and high marriage
types, but that low types are able to send at most two of their kids to college. This
is actually a relatively mild constraint. Since only families who have three high-
aptitude children are constrained, this implies that only 3% of low-type families are
affected by the borrowing constraints in the steady state, Of course, as outlined
in the previous section, it is necessary to check that our assumptions on credit
constraints are consistent with wages, consumption requirements and the cost of
skill acquisition. We leave this for later in the analysis.
Sorting
Next we assign a value to 9, the fraction of marriages which involve perfect sort-
ing. In our model this is the correlation between the education levels of spouses.
We use our sample from the PSID to obtain an estimate of this correlation for
the US, yielding 0 =.6.
Steady-State Determination of 3
Given the values assigned thus far we can solve for 3 (the fraction of population
that goes to college in the steady state). Doing so, we obtain /3= .55.Thisturns
out to be a close match with the data. According to data from the CPS for 1996,
among individuals aged 25-34, roughly 55% have at least some college. Moreover,
this fraction is basically the same for those individuals aged 35—44 and 45 —5415
Wetake this as an indication that the implications of our parameterized model
for educational attainment in the steady state are reasonable.
Production Function
It remains to specify the production function. We choose a constant elasticity
of substitution production function:
Note that the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers can be written as andthat
the relative wage of skilled to unskilled workers is given by -- As
is well known, the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages has varied considerably over
the last 30 years in the US.16 Recall that our two skill groups are those with at
'5Source: Statistical Abstract of the US, 1997, Table 245.
°See, e.g., Katz and Murphy (1992).
16least some college and those with high school or less. Based on the data in Katz
and Murphy (1992), we match a ratio of 1.9 for our benchmark case. This value
is at the upper end of what has been observed in the US, so in our robustness
check we redo our analysis assuming a ratio of 1.4 and find that it has no impact
on our results.
There is a literature that attempts to estimate the degree of substitutability
between skilled and unskilled labor that we can use to provide an estimate forp.
This literature suggests that a reasonable elasticity of substitution is 1.5, which
implies p =3317 Usingthis value of p and matching the above-mentioned value
for the skill premium implies b =.6865.As we will see shortly, the elasticity
of substitution is a key parameter for our analysis—if we use a value that is
substantially larger, it becomes much harder for our model to generate large effects
from changes in sorting. Lastly, for ease of interpretation of our results, we choose
a value of A to scale steady-state unskilled wages to some "reasonable" value,
which we set to be 30, 000. This is purely an issue of normalization.'8
Other Properties of the Steady State
Having assigned parameter values, we can solve for the steady state in which
educational attainment is dictated by the observed values of the 1'3's as discussed
previously. We now report some additional properties of this steady state. The
model produces a distribution for individual income, with mass at two points,
corresponding to the skilled and unskilled wage rates. The standard deviation of
log income in the steady state equals .32. Distributions of annual income in the
US typically imply a value of around .6 for this figure. Alternatively, the lifetime
income distribution generated by Fullerton and Rogers (1993) using PSID data
yields a value around .4. Since we are relying entirely on the skill premium to
generate our variation in income it is not surprising that we produce less variation
than is found in the data.
Lastly, we can also compute the standard deviation and mean of the educa-
tional attainment distribution. We assume that a high-school education corre-
sponds to e11.3 and a college education corresponds to e =15.0,our choice
of numbers given by the average educational attainments of children with high
school or less and those with college or more in our PSID sample. The resulting
standard deviation and mean of the steady state educational attainment distri-
'7See Krusell et al. (1997) and the references therein for more detail.
'81t is not clear what the "best' normalization is, since in our model these are lifetime earnings.
Rescaling of this variable, of course implies that the parametersand iineedto be scaled
accordingly as well.
17bution are equal to 1.84, and 13.3. For our sample of children from the PSID
the corresponding values are 2.56 and 12.9. Given our restriction to two levels
of education it is not surprising that we generate less variation than the data.
The fact that our mean is somewhat higher is related to the fact that it is the
steady-state value. Even if recent cohorts have had relatively constant educa-
tional attainments, average educational attainment continues to increase as older
generations are replaced with younger generations.
5. The Effects of Increased Sorting
We now use the parameterized model to assess the effects associated with an
exogenous increase in the degree of sorting in the marriage market. Our objective
is to examine whether the concern that some writers have expressed—namely, that
increased sorting will lead to increased inequality—has any significant quantitative
support (in contrast with Kremer's findings). To this end, we consider a large
change in the degree of sorting: from 9 =.6to 8 =919
Table 2 displays the main results. The first column gives the values for the
original steady state (i.e., 9 =.6).The second column shows what the steady
state would look like if 0wereto increase to .9 and the tightness of borrowing
constraints were unchanged (i.e., all high-aptitude children from middle and high-
type families could afford to attend college but among low-type families at most
two children per household could be sent to college). The third column reports
the new steady-state values ensuing from the 0change,but assumes that the wage
change associated with this increase tightens constraints for low-type families to
the point that they can afford to send at most one of their children to college.2°
Below we discuss each case in turn.
'9Note that Kremer (1997) also considers a large change in the degree of sorting.
20Later in this section we show that this outcome is consistent with choices for and ii.
18Table 2
Effects of Increased Sorting on Steady State
9= .6,F1 =.309= .9,F, =.30O=.9,Ft =.22
inean(e) 13.3 13.2 12.8
std(e) 1.84 1.85 1.82
cv(e) .138 .140 .142
/3 .55 .52 .42
n3/n 1.236 1.076 .713
w5/w 1.900 2.085 2.746
w, 30,000 28,120 23,340
std(log y) .319 .367 .500
Case 1: Set of Borrowing Constrained Individuals Remains Constant
We begin by comparing the first two columns. This amounts to examining the
effects of increased sorting holding the pattern of college attendance fixed. The
first three rows report the mean, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation
for the steady-state distribution of educational attainment. The effect of the
increase in sorting is to cause a small decrease in the mean of the distribution
(less than one percent), an even smaller increase in the standard deviation (less
than one half of one percent) and a roughly one percent increase in the coefficient
of variation.21
The decrease in mean educational attainment results from the decrease in the
fraction of the population that goes to college; the fourth row shows that the
fraction of the population that becomes skilled falls to 52% in the new steady
state. It is important to underscore that this fall in /3 implies a decrease in the
ratio of skilled to unskilled workers of almost 13%, as shown in row 5. As the
next row indicates, this change in relative labor supply induces an increase in the
skill premium of 10%.22 The next to last row shows that the standard deviation
of the log income distribution increases by about 15%.
21Note that since our educational attainment distribution is over two levels, its variance is
maximized when the population is evenly distributed across them. Hence, whether a change
in /3 results in an increase or decrease in the standard deviation of education depends entirely
upon whether the starting value was above or below .5. Having said this, we think that what is
most relevant to notice is that the change in the standard deviation is very small, rather than
the direction in which it changes.
22Recall that the elasticity of substitution in the production function is 1.5, which implies
that the percent change in n5/n, will be 1.5 times as large as the percent change in w/w
forsmall changes. For large changes this expression continues to hold exactly in logs, but only
aproximately in ratios.
19Case 2: Set of Borrowing Constrazned Individuals Changes
In the case above we assumed that borrowing constraints did not become more
binding as a result of the increase in the degree of sorting. As shown in row 7, this
resulted in a decrease in the wage of unskilled workers by almost $2000. and hence
a decrease in low-type family income of almost $4000. This wage decrease makes
it possible that low-type families will be able to send fewer children to college than
previously and hence that the equilibrium steady-state value of z used in column
two is no longer a feasible one. Consequently, in the third column we assume
that as a result of the 9 increase, in the new steady state low-type families can
afford to send a maximum of one child to college, rather than two. This constraint
affects families with two and three high-aptitude children (respectively 20 and 3
percent of low-type families approximately), causing the fraction of children from
low-type marriages that go to college to drop from .30 to .22 (as indicated by the
reported values of F1). Thus, the new steady-state equilibrium is now given by
/3 =.42(and the equilibrium shown in the second column is eliminated since at
/3= .52,z1 should equal one rather than two).
As the table shows, the tightening of borrowing constraints has a dramatic
effect on how the 0 increase affects the income distribution. In particular. although
the change in the mean level of education is still relatively small (a bit under 4%),
this masks a dramatic change in the fraction of the population that goes to college
which falls by 42% implying a drop of more than 40% in the ratio of skilled to
unskilled workers. The skill premium (w/w) also increases by more than 40%,
to 2.75, and the standard deviation of distribution of log income increases by more
than 50%!
We next verify that the structural change in college attendance decisions is
a feasible equilibrium outcome. As discussed in Section 3, this requires showing
that certain inequalities are satisfied. In what follows let w(/3) be the unskilled
wage rate when the equilibrium value of skilled to unskilled workers. 3, is given
in column i of Table 2.
For column 1 to represent an equilibrium steady state, it must be that type 1
families can send two but not three children to college. This requires (i) 2v + 5e <
2w(/31)<3v+ 5 23Forthe allocations in column 2 to be infeasible because at
those wages 1-type families cannot afford to send two children tb college. requires
(ii) 2i + 5 >2w(/32).Lastly, to ensure that the outcome in column 3 is an
equilibrium requires checking that it allows type 1 families to send one child and
2Qf course, if low-type families can afford to send two children to college, so can higher-type
families.
20type m families to send two to college. That is, it requires (iii) v + 5ë < 2w( 133)
and (iv) 2v+4ë < w33)+w8(/33). Inequalities (ii) and (iii) imply v> 2(w(132)—
wCB3)),sothat ii>9, 402 given the numbers in Table 2. There are many
combinations of ,-'and thatsatisfy these inequalities. For example, v =11,000,
and 7.000. A last inequality to check is that high-ability individuals prefer
to go to college over high school. It is easy to verify that this is indeed the case.
We do not attach too much significance to the magnitudes of v andThe
simple choices that we made about utility functions and the fact that we abstract
from life-cycle income dynamics and the timing of college attendance make us
reluctant to do so as does our unwillingness to interpret the borrowing constraints
literally as the ability to afford college. The main point of the above paragraph is
to establish the logical consistency of our argument that the change in sorting can
lead to a change in the extent to which credit constraints bind. It is perhaps not
surprising that this can be done, given that we have not imposed any discipline
on our choices of and v.24
6. Discussion and Comparison With Kremer
To summarize the main result of the preceding section, we find in our calibrated
model that a large increase in the degree of sorting may be expected to produce
substantial changes in inequality. This is true independently of whether one be-
lieves that borrowing constraints play any role in the economy, as the results in
column two of Table 2 demonstrate. These effects are significantly magnified if
borrowing constraints are tightened as indicated by the last column of Table 2.
Our results support a conclusion very different from that reached by Kremer
(1997). \Vhereas he concluded that a large increase in sorting would have little
effect on steady-state inequality given a reasonable parameterization, we have
concluded quite the opposite. In this section we analyze what lies behind this
difference. Having identified the factors that generate such different conclusions,
2tHaving said this, however, we do offer one check of "reasonableness" for the value of e.
Specifically, we can compute the annual rate of return to spending on education. This obviously
depends on how many years one assumes there are between the expenditure and the return
in the form of higher wages, since the expenditure takes place in the fi'rst period of life but
yields higher wages in the second period. If one interprets a period to be a generation, then 20
years may be reasonable. On the other hand, if one wants to look at the time between college
expenditures and the midpoint of a typical working life, then a slightly smaller period length
may be appropriate. In any case, for the steady state in column 1, the annual rate of return lies
between 5 and 10 percent as we vary the number of years between 10 and 20.
21we then examine the robustness of our results to different specifications. We first
turn to a brief review Kremer's analysis.
6.1. Review of Kremer '97
Kremer posits an intergenerational model of marriage, fertility and educational
attainment in which a child's educational attainment e can be written as a linear
function of parental and neighborhood average education. For expositionalpur-
poses we consider the argument in the simplest context, and hence abstract from
neighborhood effects.
The model assumes that all individuals marry and have two kids. A child's
educational attainment is determined by the following linear relationship:
(e,t+ = +
2+
where e+iisthe education level for the child,and are the education
levels of the two parents, and E is a normally distributed random shock that is iid
acrossfamilies, with mean 0 and standard deviation equal to 0EAnexogenous
(assortative) matching of individuals takes place such that Pm1Sthe correlation
between the education levels of parents.
Assuming that parameter values are constant over time, it is straightforward
to characterize the steady-state distribution of education. Specifically, it will be




[1 — a2(1 + p)/2]5
Kremer'sobjective was to determine how changes in sorting among marriage
partners (i.e., Pm)wouldaffect the level of inequality in the steady state. His main
measure of inequality was the standard deviation of educational attainment and
he argued that since there is a linear relationship between educational attainment
and log of income in the cross-section, that this measure of inequality would
probably be a good proxy for inequality in log of income as well. We shall return
to this point later.
The effect of an increase in p on the steady state distribution of education
can be read off of the above equations. Because of the assumption of linearity.
22there is no effect of Pmonthe mean of the distribution of education, but its
standard deviation is increasing in p, i.e., increases in the degree of sorting
among parents will increase the standard deviation of education. Obviously, this
model is at least qualitatively consistent with the view that increased sorting leads
to increased inequality.
Kremer's main contribution, however, was to show that while the model sup-
ported this view qualitatively, there was little support for the view that this effect
was important quantitatively. It is easy to see that in this model the percent
change in the standard deviation of income due to a change in the sorting pa-
rameter Pmisdetermined solely by the magnitude of the parameter a. Using
data from the PSID (the same source that we used to parameterize our model)
he obtained an estimate of a of about .4 and Pm.6.25 Inthis case, an increase
in Pmfrom.6 to .9 would result in only a 1.4% increase in the standard deviation
of education.26
Next Kremer argued that even if his estimate of a were somewhat off, his
conclusion would survive due to the insensitivity of his result to modest changes
in a. The easiest way to see this is by asking how large a would need to be
in order that an increase in Pmfrom.6 to .9 to result in a 10% increase in the
standard deviation of log income. The answer is given by solving the equation:
1.1 1
[1 —a2(1+ .6)/2]5 [1 —a2(1+ .9)/2]5
which yields .78 as the required value of a.
Krerner's paper is mainly about the effect of increased neighborhood and mar-
ital sorting on the distribution of education. If, however, one takes the view (as
Kremer does in his introduction) that log earnings are approximately linear in
years of education, and that the coefficients in this relationship are invariant to
changes in the distribution of education, then the same conclusion applies to in-
equality in income; a large increase in sorting will not significantly affect income
inequality in the US.
25Whenneighborhood effects were included the sum of coefficients on parental and neighbor-
hood education was about .55. This does not change his conlusions.
261n fact had p,, increased from an original value of .1 to .9, this still would only result in a
3.7% increase in the standard deviation of log income.
236.2. Discussion
It should clear from our review of Krerner's work that his main finding is really
about the small impact of sorting on the level of inequality in the skill distribution.
O'ir results in Table 2 do not contradict this finding, especially if we assume that
the increase in sorting does not affect the bindingness of borrowing constraints.
ic further demonstrate that there is no inconsistency between our results and his
we perform his analysis on data generated from our model. Specifically, using
data generated by the steady-state of our calibrated model (i.e., column 1 in
Table 2), we take a random sample of 1200 families and run a regression of a
child's educational attainment (ej,t+i) on a constant and the average educational
attainment of its parents (ej,).27Asnoted previously, we assume that a high-
school education corresponds to e =11.3and a college education corresponds to
e =15.0.2 Wedo this 100 times and average across the trials. The result of this
exercise is:29
=6.69+ .5leLt
It follows that if Kremer had performed his exercise using data generated from our
model he would still have reached the same conclusion; i.e., he would have con-
cluded that the coefficient on average parental education is too small to generate
large effects on the standard deviation of educational attainment.30
\Vhat gives rise to our very different conclusion about income inequality is that
in our model there is an interaction between changes in the skill distribution and
the price of skill. This interaction is governed by three elements that are absent
in Kremer's analysis but which are central to generating this effect on the price
of skill: (i) The existence of a nonlinear relationship between parental years of
education and those of their children, (ii) A negative correlation between fertility
and parental education, and (iii) Wage rates that are sensitive to changes in the
skill distribution. As we shall see, it turns out that if we had only incorporated
any one of these three elements, we would have reached the same conclusion as
We note that since our model is not linear, this regression is not suggested by our model.
-Thespecific values chosen here affect the constant term in the regression but have very little
effect on the coefficient on parent's education.
-Runningthis regression on our sample from the PSID yields a coefficient of .37. This
discrepancy is accounted for by the fact that in our model we compress the education distribution
to --o levels, thereby increasing the correlation between the education levels of parents and their
ch:dren.We have verified this via simulation.
• Xote that since our model is not linear, it does not lead one to run this regression. We run
th: regression simply to illustrate how Kremer's analysis would look in our set-up.
24Kremer.3' But, allowing for the interaction of all three factors (especially (i) and
(iii)) leads to a very different conclusion.
We begin with a discussion of the third factor. The distribution of labor
earnings can be thought of as depending on the interaction of two factors. One
is the distribution of skill (in our model, education) across individuals, and the
second is the price of skill (i.e., the skill premium). As stated in our discussion of
Table 2, the impact of sorting on the level of inequality in the skill distribution is
small. In fact, were wages not responsive to the distribution of skills, the change
in the standard deviation of log income would have been around one-half of one
percent. What drives our results is that a large change in sorting produces a
large change in the skill premium, even if it seemingly does not produce "large"
effects on mean educational attainment. As can be seen from a comparison of
columns one and two in Table 2, a less than one percent decrease in the mean of
the education distribution is associated with an almost thirteen percent decrease
in the relative supply of skilled labor. This translates to a ten percent increase in
the wage premium, leading to a significant change in the distribution of income.
To better understand how various elements interact to yield the increase in the
skill premium, note first that in our model the impact of a change in 0 on
can be decomposed into two distinct effects. The first concerns how a given change
in 9 affects ,andthe second with how a given change in 3 affects w/w.This
decomposition is useful because college attendance and fertility profiles are only
relevant for the first effect, whereas the elasticity of substitution in the production
function is only relevant for the second.32
Consider now the roles of fertility differences and of the function relating
parental education to children's education in generating the change in 3.Recall
from the discussion in Section 3 that a sufficient condition for increased sorting
to impact negatively on 3isfor faF,, —2fmFm+ f1F1 < 0 and fh —2f,,,+ f > 0
(with at least one strict inequality). Our parameter values strictly satisfy both
311n fact, Kremer considers a markov model in section IV of his paper, and finds little effect of
sorting on the standard deviation of education. This is obviously consistent with our findings.
We have also rewritten Kremer's model to account for differential fertility and used numerical
techniques to compute the steady-state distribution of education. Once again, changes in sorting
have little effect on the standard deviation of this distribution.
321n particular, the change in log w/w,, equals the inverse of this elasticity times the change
in log/3/(1—/3). Moreover. how this change in w/w,.issplit between changes in each of the two
wages is entirely determined by the elasticity and the initial value of fi. Had we assumed p =1,
i.e., a linear production function, there would be no effect of sorting on wages and. as discussed
previously, we would have found very small effects from increased sorting on inequality.
25inequalities, guaranteeing that increased sorting will decrease the fraction of the
population that attends college. The magnitude of the respective contributions
of our fertility profile and the concavity of the intergenerational education trans-
mission function will be discussed in the next section on robustness.
One can ask under what conditions our model would give rise to the conclusion
that changes in sorting do not have significant effects on the income distribution
(without shutting down the effect of changes in skill distribution on wages). A
simple condition is given by the combination of a linear relationship between par-
ents' education and children's' (i.e., 2Fm= F,,+ F1) and no fertility differentials
(i.e., f3 =ffor all j). But these are precisely the assumptions made by Kre-
mer in his paper—all parents have two kids and the child's years of education are
linear in average parental years of education. Thus, had we adopted Kremer's as-
sumptions our model would not have generated any effect from increased sorting
on the steady-state value of ,andhence no effect on wage rates or inequality
either. Moreover, the fact that wage rates would not have changed would nec-
essarily imply that the bindingness of borrowing constraints would be unaffected
and consequently there would be no scope for any change in college attendance
decisions via this channel either.
Lastly, our analysis also suggests that one exercise caution in interpreting re-
gressions of child's educational attainment on parental educational attainment.
In our discussion of Kremer's work, this regression coefficient was denoted cand
was treated as a structural parameter that would not be affected by changes in
sorting. However, as should be clear from our model, the degree to which educa-
tion is heritable may differ across family types for a variety of reasons including
the presence of borrowing constraints. The degree of sorting, as evidenced in the
last column of Table 2, affects the bindingness of borrowing constraints and hence
the degree to which parents' education is passed on their children.33
7. Robustness
In this section we report how the findings from our benchmark model are affected
by changes in our parameterization. We restrict our attention to the results
generated under the assumption that the bindingness of boriowing constraints
33Running a linear regression for the steady state in column three of Table 2 (using the same
procedure described earlier), we obtain 59 rather than the 51 obtained for the scenarios in
columns one and two, although the true "heritability" of education is unchanged as reflected in
the 'y2's.
26are unchanged by the degree of sorting. Our main finding is that our result
of a quantitatively important increase in income inequality arising from (large)
changes in the degree of sorting is robust to reasonable variation in the model's
parameterization.
We begin by considering how alternative profiles for fertility affect our results.
An issue with our choice of fertility profile in the benchmark model is that for
other purposes we generally interpret low-type marriages as those in which neither
parent has gone beyond high school. Our sample from the PSID has completed
fertility profiles only for those individuals that we have designated as parents
(recall that these are individuals in the PSID with children older than 25 in '93).
Thus, our parents are from fairly old cohorts and the fraction of this group with
high school or less is in fact quite large (over 55%). The fertility differential across
educational classes for these cohorts is consequently lower: 2.26 versus 1.86 for
all other couples—a difference of a bit over 21 percent (rather than the 50% that
we have used). While it is true that the bottom quintile of the sample does have
roughly 50% higher fertility, this quintile would be comprised of those that have
less than a high school education. As we report below, however, even abstracting
completely from any fertility differences we still obtain large quantitative effects
resulting from changes in the degree of sorting.
We examine two alternatives for the fertility profile (fh, fm,f)—(2,2,2)and
(2,2,4)——-to the profile (2,2,3) used in our benchmark model.34 In each case we
recalibrate our model to match the same statistics as before, and perform the
same comparative statics exercise as in the movement from column 1 to column 2
in Table 2. That is, leaving the bindingness of constraints unchanged, we examine
the effects of an increase in 6 from .6 to .9. As can be seen in Table 3 below, the
basic message is the same for both of the alternative fertility profiles. Even with
no fertility differences the increase in income inequality is still substantial, albeit
somewhat less than in Table 2 (10% versus 15%). For the case in which low-
type families have four kids the increase is slightly more than 12%. One might
have expected larger effects for this case, but the fact that the initial steady-state
value is substantially lower as a result of the recalibration translates into a smaller
change in the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers.
3'We also note that using fertility rates from the cross section may understate the impact of
fertility differences for some purposes. The model does not allow for the fact that lower income
families have their first child some five years before richer families. This would increase the
relative size of the poorer group in steady state by more than what would be predicted based
solely on differences in the number of children. See Knowles (1999) for details.
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std(logy).308 .341 .321 .361
Next we examine how our findings are affected by changes in the profile of
F3 's used in the calibration. In Table 4 we examine the effect of varying Fm from
its value of .63 in our benchmark model by decreasing the degree of concavity
in the relationship between parental and children's education to the point where
it is linear (Fm =.555).In each case the production function parameters are
recalibrated to match the same statistics as before.
Table 4
Effect of Alternative Fm'S
.fh =fm = 2,f1= 3,F=.81,F1=.30 -
Fm=.63 Fm =.58 Fm =.555
9=.69=99=.69=.99=.6O=.9
mean(e) 13.3 13.2 13.3 13.2 13.2 13.2
std(e) 1.84 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85
cv(e) .138 .140 .139 .140 .140 .140
j3 .55 .52 .54 .51 .53 .51
n5/n 1.24 1.08 1.15 1.06 1.11 1.05
w8/w 1.9 2.09 1.9 2.01 1.9 1.97
w 30,00028,12030.00028,82030,00029,253
std(logy).319 .367 .320 .349 .321 .340
As can be seen. as we move closer to the linear case, the increase in the standard
deviation of log income caused by an increase in sorting becomes smaller, but even
28in the linear case this measure increases by more than 6 percent. Increasing the
degree of concavity in this profile, on the other hand, would have the effect of
increasing the impact of a change in sorting.
Given the importance in our analysis of a non-linear relationship between chil-
dren's and parents schooling, we think it is of interest to document these beyond
the markov transition probabilities reported earlier. Table 5 below presents sev-
eral regression results that incorporate higher-order terms in Kremer's original
regression.35 These regressions are based on our sample of parents and children
from the PSID.
Table 5
Children's Education as a Function of Parent's Education
Dependent variable is years of education for the child.










N 1385 1385 1385
R2 0.1850.2080.216
Column (1) in this table is the equivalent to column (5) in Table II in Kremer,
with basically identical results. What columns (2) and (3) show, however, is
that there is strong support for the notion that this relationship is nonlinear.
In every specification, all terms are significant at the one percent level. Note
that in the cubic specification the second derivative changes from positive to
negative at =12.26. Hence, up to this point there are "increasing returns" to
parental education in terms of "producing" child's educatioff, but beyond this
°Although Kremer runs a regression that includes the square of parental average education,
he also includes the square of average neighborhood education and an interactive term between
parental and neighborhood effects. In that regression all variables are statistically insignificant,
including average parental education.
29point there are "decreasing returns" to parental education.36 The fact that there
are increasing returns in the lower part of the distribution suggests that increased
sorting within this part of the distribution may actually increase mean educational
attainment within this group. Our analysis abstracts from this issue since it is
concerned with the degree of sorting between the top and bottom parts of the
income distribution rather than the within group sorting. There we find a concave
relationship between children and average parental years of education.
Our conclusion is also not sensitive to the choice of the value for the wage
premium. Although the extent of income inequality in the steady state is affected
by this ratio, using values for the wage premium anywhere in the range of 1.4 to
1.9 has virtually no impact on the extent towhich the increase in sorting increases
the steady-state standard deviation of log income.
Lastly, we consider how are results are affected by considering alternative
values for the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers. In
our benchmark model we assumed a value for this elasticity equal to 1.5 (i.e.,
p =.33).Here we report how our conclusions are affected by assuming values
of 1.0 (p =0)and 2.0 (p =.5).While the range of estimates in the literature
seems to be relatively tightly bunched around 1.5, we consider a relatively large
interval for our sensitivity analysis to indicate the effect of this key parameter
on our results. As above, we focus on how this change would affect the results
assuming that the bindingness of constraints is unaffected (i.e., a move from the
first to the second column in Table 2).
Table 6 contains the results, with the first column repeating the findings from
Table 2 in order to facilitate comparisons. As the change in 3(andhence all
changes in the distribution of education) is not affected by the value of this elas-
ticity, we only include information on wages and inequality. As expected, the
change in the standard deviation of log income is decreasing in this elasticity, but
even when p =0the resulting change is still substantial—more than 11%. We
conclude again that our results are robust to changes in this key elasticity.
°We have also run regressions by splitting the sample into two groups: parents withaverage
education less than or equal to 12 years, and parents with average education greater than or
equal to 12 years. These results confirmed the above finding concerning the switch in returns
to scale.
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This paper investigated the effects of increased assortative matching in marriage.
We constructed a dynamic model of education acquisition and parameterized it
to US data. We conclude that large increases in sorting are likely to have quanti-
tatively significant effects on the degree of income inequality.37 Our conclusion is
independent of the existence of imperfect borrowing markets. If borrowing con-
straints exist and are tightened as a result of the increase in sorting, the effects
of the sorting increase on the degree of inequality are magnified.
Several factors contribute to our obtaining this conclusion. In particular, a
negative correlation between fertility and education, a decreasing marginal effect
of parental education on children's years of education, and a process of wage
determination that is sensitive to the relative supply of skilled to unskilled workers
all play a role in our qualitative and quantitative analysis.
Our model interpreted borrowing constraints as high-aptitude individuals un-
able to borrow to cover the cost of obtaining a college education. We do not take
this interpretation literally. An alternative formulation would be to assume that a
child's aptitude is determined jointly by parental educational attainment and the
resources that they devote to the child's development (for example the quality of
K-12 education the child obtains). If parents are unable to borrow against their
child's future income to provide them with greater schooling resources, parental
income is again a factor determining investment in a child's future education. This
alternative interpretation does not require borrowing constraints to be operative
at the time a person decides whether to attend college. Children who grow up in
poor families will be less likely to attend college, not because they cannot obtain
a loan to finance their college education, but because they havhad lower quality
K-12 educations and are less able to benefit from a college education.
7A recent study by Dahan and Gaviria (1999) using household survey data for several Latin
American countries finds a positive relationship between sorting and inequality.
31The model we constructed assumed for simplicity that both fertility and the
matching process were exogenously determined. It would be of interest in future
work to endogenize these variables.38 If, as is reasonable to assume, lower family
income leads to greater fertility and greater wage differentials lead to more effort
to match with higher-income individuals, we conjecture that these would serve to
reinforce our conclusions.39
38Becker (1973) is the classic static model of marriage. See, for example, Burdett and Coles
(1997) and Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992) for models that endogenize the degree of mar-
ital sorting and Fernandez and Gali (1999) for a model that incorporates borrowing constraints
into the matching process.
See Fernandez (1999) for a model that endogenizes fertility and sorting.
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